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DAMAGES IN GOVERINMENT CONSTRUCTION
CONTRACTS
GAINES V. PALMES*
INTRODUCTION
O NE of the most complex problems presented in claims under the
standard Government construction contract' is to prove the amount
of damages sustained where the contract work cannot be performed as
planned. This article deals principally with proof of the amount of
damages where there is a breach of contract, and proof of the amount
of increased costs sustained, where a remedy is provided under the terms
of the contract, when the contract work is delayed and operations are
disrupted.
As the law now seems to stand, there is a great difference between the
extent of damages recoverable where a breach of a contract is involved,
and the extent to which increased costs are compensable under the terms
of the contract. The author uses the words "damages" and "increased
costs" advisedly, because the courts hold that administrative agencies are
without authority to pay claims for damages as the term is used in the
ordinary sense of the word.2 It is the duty of the administrative agencies
to pay a contractor for increased costs incurred where a remedy is pro-
vided in the contract.' As to the latter, particular reference is made to
the standard "Changes" article4 and the "Changed Conditions" article5 of
the Standard Form of Government Construction Contract. These two
articles provide for an equitable adjustment in the contract price. In the
case of breach of contract, in the absence of a contract remedy, the con-
tractor must look to the courts for relief. However, under some circum-
stances, such as where there is no substantial dispute as to the facts, and
* Mlember of District of Columbia and State of Mississippi Bars. Appreciation is extended
to James Perkins Parker, Esq., of Washington, D. C.; and to Walter W. Downs, Esq. and
Richard Mlarlink, Esq. of the Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company, Hartford, Conn.
for their assistance in furnishing some of the references.
1. U.S. Standard Form 23, approved by the Secretary of the Treasury, revised April 3,
1942; 44 C.F.R. § 54.13 (Supp. 1956).
2. Langevin v. United States, 100 Ct. Cl. 15, 30 (1943); Phoenix Bridge Co. v. United
States, 85 Ct. Cl. 603, 630 (1937).
3. John A. Johnson Contracting Corp. v. United States, 132 CL Cf. 646, 132 F. Supp. 693
(1953).
4. U.S. Standard Form 23, art. 3. For a general discussion of this matter see Cunco,
Extra Work Under Federal Government Construction Contracts, 24 Fordham L. Rev. 556,
560 (1956).
S. U.S. Standard Form 23, art. 4.
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
a question of law is involved, relief may be had at the General Accounting
Office.'
No attempt will be made here to deal with such questions as the right
of the contracting officer to order changes in the contract, the permissible
extent thereof, or with factors pertinent to determining whether or not a
changed condition was encountered.7 However, an effort will be made to
deal with the similarity of the evidence required to establish the amount
of increased costs sustained where a changed condition causing delays
and disruption of operations is encountered, and the amount of damages
suffered through a breach of contract which has a similar effect upon the
contractor's operations.
In estimating the contract cost, a contractor has the right to base his
cost upon the performance of the work in an orderly manner and upon
the carrying out of an uninterrupted operation such as any competent con-
tractor must plan in advance of bidding. Of course the contractor must
allow for certain contingencies which may normally be foreseen, such as ad-
verse weather conditions and other expected delays. The Government, in
preparing its estimate of cost, must do likewise. Specific cases dealing
with an equitable adjustment will first be set forth and discussed.
EQUITABLE ADJUSTMENT FOR CHANGED CONDITIONS
The leading and most recent case decided by the Court of Claims deal-
ing with equitable adjustment under the terms of the "Changed Condi-
tions" article of the contract is that of John A. Johnson Contracting Corp.
v. United States. In that case recovery was allowed for increased costs
sustained as a result of defective roads which were constructed by the
Government and used by the contractor in building a hospital project.
The court held that both parties to the contract assumed that plaintiff
would use the roads furnished by the Government as haul roads in con-
nection with its building operations. The contracting officer took the
position that it was plaintiff's responsibility to keep the roads passable,
or to construct its own roads. The court rejected the Government's con-
tention and held that both the Government and the contractor expected
that the roads would be adequate for use as construction roads in per-
forming the contract, and that the poor condition of the roads constituted
a changed condition. The court said that plaintiff was entitled to recover
under article 4, the "Changed Conditions" article, for expenditures rea-
sonably and naturally flowing from encountering the unforeseen condi-
tions. In this case the Court of Claims, probably for the first time, clearly
6. 31 U.S.C.A. §§ 71, 74 (1954).
7. See Gaskins, Changed Conditions and Misrepresentation of Subsurface Materials as
Related to Government Construction Contracts, 24 Fordham L. Rev. 588 (1956).
8. 132 Ct. CI. 645, 132 F. Supp. 698 (1955).
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laid down a rule of law with respect to the extent of the applicability of
article 4 of the contract. Plaintiff's theory of the case was that the Gov-
ernment had impliedly guaranteed to supply a usable system of roads and
its failure to do so constituted a breach of the contract. The court held,
in effect, that the theory advanced by plaintiff was immaterial, and that
the real problem was, . . .whether the disastrous failure of the roads was
an unforeseen event from the expense of which the contractor was en-
titled to be relieved by the application of Article IV."O The court ruled
that the measure of plaintiff's compensation would have been the same
on either basis. Therefore, the effect of the court's decision was that re-
gardless of whether the damages suffered were caused by an unforeseen
condition, or whether they resulted from a breach of the contract, the
measure of damages would have been the same. Indeed, the nature of
the types of damages awarded by the court makes this clear.
The claims asserted were for the costs of: road stabilization and re-
construction, drainage maintenance and reconstruction, regrading areas,
unusual construction methods, work damage and restoration, unusual dis-
tribution methods and rehandling of materials, reduced efficiency of
workmen, and administrative and supervisory costs. Approximately one-
half of the amount of damages was awarded for costs caused by reduced
efficiency of the workmen arising out of the unfavorable conditions under
which the contractor had to operate resulting from the unforeseen condi-
tions.
It is important to note from the decision in this case that the amount
allowed largely covered cost increases which had nothing to do with
structural changes, or with the cost of performance after access to the
buildings covered by the contract was accomplished. The majority of the
items allowed represented increased costs incurred in gaining access to
the various buildings and excess costs occasioned by reduced efficiency of
labor after the workmen and materials were transported to the buildings.
In short, the damages allowed were in the nature of collateral costs re-
sulting chiefly from delays and disruption of operations. The completed
project as built was the same as contracted for. Hence the increased costs
allowed may be said to have been more in the nature of consequential
damages than direct damages.
Except for the difference in the language used in article 4 of the con-
tract, it is difficult to distinguish the Johnson case from the case of United
States v. Rice."0 The contract provision in the former case provides, with
respect to equitable adjustment, that the contract shall be modified to
provide for any increase or decrease of cost "resulting from such condi-
9. Id. at 656, 132 F. Supp. at 703.
10. 317 U.S. 61 (1942).
1956-57]
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tions." 11 Article 4 of the contract in the Rice case provides for an equi-
table adjustment for changes made in the drawings or specifications as
may be found to be necessary if changed conditions are encountered, and
further provides that any increase or decrease of cost resulting from such
changes shall be adjusted under article 3.12
For purposes material to this discussion, article 3, authorizing the
Government to make changes in the drawings or specifications, is the
same in both contracts. Thus, no discussion of that article is deemed
necessary. The distinction relative to the extent of the adjustment to be
made in the contract price under article 4 in the two contracts cannot
be too strongly emphasized.
In the Rice case, article 4 relating to a changed condition limits the
contract adjustment to increased costs resulting from actual changes
made in the drawings or specifications.' 3 Therefore, a price adjustment,
as the Supreme Court said in the Rice case, is required only when struc-
tural changes are made to cope with a changed condition, and then only
for the value of the changed work, plus profit. 4 In that case plaintiff's
work was seriously delayed due to encountering changed conditions which
had the effect of greatly increasing the cost of performing other parts of
the contract work which were not changed. The Supreme Court held that
since the Government, by the terms of the contract, reserved the right to
11. "'ARTICLE 4. Changed conditions.-Should the contractor encounter, or the Gov-
ernment discover, during the progress of the work subsurface and/or latent conditions
at the site materially differing from those shown on the drawings or indicated in the speci-
fications, or unknown conditions of an unusual nature differing materially from those
ordinarily encountered and generally recognized as inhering in work of the character pro-
vided for in the plans and specifications, the attention of the contracting officer shall be
called immediately to such conditions before they are disturbed. The contracting officer shall
thereupon promptly investigate the conditions, and if he finds that they do so materially
differ the contract shall, with the written approval of the head of the department or his
duly authorized representative, be modified to provide for any increase or decrease of cost
and/or difference in time resulting from such conditions.'" 132 Ct. Cl. at 710.
12. See note 4 supra.
13. "'ARTICLE 4. Changed conditions.-Should the contractor encounter, or the Gov-
ernment discover, during the progress of the work, subsurface and (or) latent conditions
at the site materially differing from those shown on the drawings or indicated in the
specifications, the attention of the contracting officer shall be called immediately to such
conditions before they are disturbed. The contracting officer shall thereupon promptly
investigate the conditions, and if he finds that they materially differ from those shown
on the drawings or indicated in the specifications, he shall at once, with the written approval
of the head of the department or his representative, make such changes in the drawings and
(or) specifications as he may find necessary, and any increase or decrease of cost and (or)
difference in time resulting from such changes shall be adjusted as provided in Article 3
of this contract.'" 317 U.S. at 66.
14. 317 U.S. at 67.
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make changes, plaintiff was not entitled to recover the additional costs re-
sulting from delays caused by the changed conditions.
In article 4 of the Johnson contract no reference was made to limiting
adjustment in contract price to changes necessitated by encountering a
changed condition. It simply and clearly provides for a price adjustment
to cover any increase or decrease of cost resulting from encountering
changed conditions.
The decision in the Rice case seems to have been based entirely upon
the language of article 4. The Supreme Court held that since the Govern-
ment reserved the right to make changes upon discovery of materially
different subsurface or latent conditions from those shown on the draw-
ings or indicated in the specifications, it could not be said that delays
incident to the permitted changes amounted to a breach of the contract."
As stated, no such language is contained in article 4 of the contract in the
Johnson case. Indeed, it makes no specific reference to changes. It un-
qualifiedly provides that the contract shall be modified to cover any in-
crease or decrease in cost or time resulting from the changed conditions.
In the Rice case the Court stated:
"If there are rights to recover danmages where the govrcnmCnt excrdses its reserved
power to delay, they must be found in the particular provisions fixing the rights of
the parties." (Emphasis added.)10
It is suggested that under the revised article 4 as used in the Johnson
case the rights of the parties are fixed, and the contractor is entitled to
payment, under the contract, of the increased costs of performance and
adjustment in contract time resulting from encountering unforeseeable
conditions. Further, it appears that the increased costs allowable should
include those costs attributable to delays and disruption of operations
occasioned by the changed conditions. Accordingly, it may be said that
the bar to recovery of such increased costs as presented by the Supreme
Court in the Rice case has been removed.
In the Johnson case, the court, in determining an equitable adjustment,
allowed recovery for a number of specific items. The total amount of
$310,000 allowed for increased costs occasioned by the changed condition
included the sum of $150,000 for reduced efficiency of workmen." This
item is worthy of particular note. It covers the amount of increased labor
costs which the court found was incurred, ". . .due to the inconsistent
flow of materials and conditions hampering operations and time of travel
to and from work."s Obviously, such increased costs are not susceptible
15. Id. at 65-66.
16. Id. at 66.
17. 132 Ct. Cl. at 696.
18. Ibid.
1956-571
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of proof by actual cost records. The amount, therefore, must of necessity
be based upon an estimate. The court said: "Time and volume were
estimated on the basis of experience with a similar job during the pre-
ceding winter. Costs were itemized in terms of increased pay-rolls."'
Such a method assumes that the other job was substantially the same as
the one covered by the instant contract. There are so many factors to be
taken into account in determining whether another job or the method of
operation were similar enough to justify a comparison that extensive com-
ment is not undertaken here. It will be interesting to observe the court's
decisions in future cases dealing with similar situations.
The author suggests that the increased costs in the Johnson case could
have been more accurately established by a comparison of the actual cost
of the entire contract work as performed, with an estimate of the reasonable
cost of the work if performed without interference. Such a method was
adopted by the court in an earlier case, Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co.
v. United States,20 decided July 9, 1951, which also involved an equitable
adjustment for encountering changed conditions. Plaintiff there claimed
the difference between the actual costs of the work and its estimated costs.
The difference was adjusted by taking into account certain admitted
errors on the part of plaintiff in making its estimate, and also certain costs
actually incurred which were not attributable to encountering the changed
conditions. The court rejected plaintiff's contention on the principal
ground that the evidence failed to establish that plaintiff's estimated costs
were correct. The court awarded judgment based upon the difference be-
tween the reasonable cost of the parts of the work which were affected by
the changed conditions and the actual cost thereof. The actual cost was
based upon plaintiff's cost records. The reasonable cost of the work as
found by the court was the average amount of all other bids received,
together with the amount of the Government estimate. From the differ-
ence thus determined there was deducted the extra cost of performing
certain work for which plaintiff was responsible.
The court found that the method used was the fairest one for deter-
mining plaintiff's increased costs due to encountering the changed condi-
tions. No allowance was made for profit on the increased costs of
performance. In arriving at the fair and reasonable cost of the work the
amounts considered by the court included profit on the original contract
work. It is suggested that if the entire contract work had been affected
by the changed conditions, the method used would have been extended to
include all work instead of being confined to certain items. Indeed, in
the case of a lump sum bid both the reasonable and the actual costs must
19. Ibid.
20. 119 Ct. CI. 504, 96 F. Supp. 923 (1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 953 (1952).
[Vol. 25
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of necessity be established on an over-all basis. The end result should be
substantially the same. It should not be difficult to establish, if such is
the case, that the unaffected work was performed in an efficient manner
and at a reasonable cost.
It is significant to note that in this opinion the Court of Claims did not
cite any authority in support of the method used in arriving at the
amount of increased costs awarded.
The case seems to stand for the proposition that once the actual cost
and the reasonable cost are established, the difference represents in-
creased costs due to the fault of the Government, with the exceptions
noted above. Succinctly stated, after proof embracing all the factors
mentioned is introduced, plaintiff has made out a prima fade case and
the burden then seems to shift to the defendant.
That the court had no doubt about the propriety of awarding judgment
for increased costs in accordance with the method adopted in the Great
Lakes case, where the circumstances justify it, is shown by the case of
MacDougald Construction Co. v. United States,; decided 'May 6, 1952,
about one year after the Great Lakes decision. There the court cited
that case in following substantially the same method of determining in-
creased costs resulting from encountering a changed condition.
It is to be remembered that both the Great Lakes and MacDougald
cases involve equitable adjustments for encountering unforeseen condi-
tions; a breach of contract is not involved. However, in both cases plain-
tiff's operations were completely disrupted which is often the case when
there is a breach of contract.
The Court of Claims recognized the similarity of proof in the two types
of claims in its most recent opinion dealing with the question of the meas-
ure of damages to be applied in a claim involving a breach of contract,
F. H. McGraw & Co. v. United States,- - decided April 5, 1955. This case
is set forth and discussed below.
DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT
The courts uniformly hold that the Government is liable for delays
caused by it in the absence of a clause in the contract expressly exempting
it from liability.2
21. 122 Ct. CI. 210 (1952).
22. 131 Ct. CL 501, 130 F. Supp. 394 (1955).
23. Plumley v. United States, 226 U.S. 545 (1913); United States v. Bueller, 113 U.S.
153 (1885); United States v. Speed, 75 U.S. (S Wall.) 77 (186); Clark v. United States,
73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 543 (1S67); Geo. A. Fuller Co. v. United States, 103 Ct. CI. 70, 69
F. Supp. 409 (1947); Harwood-Nebel Constr. Co. v. United States, 105 Ct. Cl. 116 (1945);
Sobel v. United States, 33 Ct. Cl. 149 (193) ; Plato v. United States, 86 CL Cl. 655 (1933) ;
Rust Engineering Co. v. United States, 36 Ct. Cl. 461 (1938); Phoenix Bridge Co. v. United
1956-571
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
Uncertainty of Amount
"Uncertainty as to the amount of damage . . .does not preclude re-
covery where the fact of damage is clearly established. . . if a reasonable
basis for computation is afforded although the result may be only approxi-
mate."2 4 In First Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. United States,2" the
Court of Claims said that when the plaintiff has proved that the contract
was breached and he was damaged as a result thereof, ". . . absolute
certainty as to the amount of damages is not essential, this being a matter
for reasonable determination according to the circumstances of each
case. ' 26 The court went on to say that: "The underlying principle is full
compensation for the wrong done, and the general rule is that the com-
pensation shall be equal to the injury. 'The breach is the standard by
which the compensation is to be measured, and all that the law requires is
that such damages be allowed as, in the judgment of fair men, directly
and naturally resulted from the breach of the contract for which the suit
is brought.' ,27
Where the breach of a contract interferes with the proper performance
of the contract in accordance with its terms, the injured party may re-
cover damages to the extent, at least, of any loss which was the necessary
consequence of such interference."' As a part of damage sustained for
breach of contract, anticipated profits prevented by the breach may also
be recovered where properly proved.29 The law seems to be well estab-
lished that a party who has broken his contract will not be permitted to
escape liability because of the lack of a perfect measure of damages
caused by his breach.
The Supreme Court has gone so far as to say that the party who
States, 85 Ct. CI. 603 (1937); Karno-Smith Co. v. United States, 84 Ct. CI. 110 (1936);
John N. Knauff Co. v. United States, 78 Ct. Cl. 423 (1933); Pope v. United States, 75
Ct. Cl. 436 (1932); Donnell-Zane Co. v. United States, 75 Ct. CI. 368 (1932); Levering &
Garrigues Co. v. United States, 73 Ct. Cl. 566 (1932); Carroll v. United States, 67 Ct. Ci.
513 (1929); Weehawken Dry Dock Co. v. United States, 65 Ct. CI. 662 (1928).
24. Reiss & Weinsier, Inc. v. United States, 126 Ct. Cl. 713, 721, 116 F. Supp. 562, 567
(1953). See also Palmer v. Connecticut Ry. & Lighting Co., 311 U.S. 544 (1941); Story
Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555 (1931); Eastman Kodak Co.
v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359 (1927).
25. 110 Ct. Cl. 280, 76 F. Supp. 250 (1948).
26. Id. at 326, 76 F. Supp. at 274.
27. Id. at 326, 76 F. Supp. at 274, citing Needles v. United States, 101 Ct. Cl. 535, 618
(1944).
28. United States v. Barlow, 184 U.S. 123 (1902); United States v. Smith, 94 U.S. 214
(1876).
29. Anvil Mining Co. v. Humble, 153 U.S. 540 (1894); Howard v. Stillwell and Bierce
Mfg. Co., 139 U.S. 199 (1891); United States v. Benhan, 110 U.S. 338 (1884); Suburban
Contracting Co. v. United States, 76 Ct. Cl. 533 (1932).
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voluntarily and wrongfully puts an end to a contract, and prevents the
other party from performing it, is estopped from denying that the injured
party has not been damaged to the extent of his actual loss and outlay
fairly incurred.O
Measure of Damages
It appears that the general rule is that the courts are more liberal in
awarding damages for a breach of contract than they are in awarding
increased costs in cases involving an equitable adjustment under the
terms of the contract. However, in their most recent decision involving
damages for a breach of contract the Court of Claims seems to have de-
parted in some respects from this rule. In F. H. McGraw & Co. v.
United States, heretofore referred to,3' the court said that their opinion
in the Great Lakes case, which has already been discussed at some length,
was not intended to give approval to the method of proving damages
there adopted except in an extreme case and under proper safeguards.
After reciting that the Great Lakes and MacDougald cases involved equi-
table adjustment for encountering unforeseen conditions, the court stated
that approval was not given to proof of damages for a breach of contract
claim by showing the difference in plaintiff's bid and his costs on the en-
tire job. The reason given by the court was:
"This method of proving damage is by no means satisfactory, because, among other
things, it assumes plaintiff's costs were reasonable and that plaintiff was not responsible
for any increases in cost, and because it assumes plaintiff's bid was accurately com-
puted, which is not always the case by any means." '
The facts in the McGraw case are discussed here for the purpose of
emphasizing the similarity in the nature of damages suffered in cases in-
volving breach of contract and those involving an equitable adjustment
under the contract. Plaintiff had a contract for additions to a veteransl
hospital. The work was in full progress when the Government issued a
partial stop order because of contemplated changes which affected
McGraw's entire work program. A period of 159 days elapsed between
the date of the stop order and the date of receipt of the notice to proceed
under the revised plan. McGraw was paid by the contracting officer for
changes made, and was granted an extension of time. This adjustment
did not include any damages for delay.
The court held that the Government had a reasonable time to make
changes in the plans, but that it was a breach of contract if the Govern-
ment's delay in making changes unreasonably disrupted the work for
30. United States v. Benhan, 110 U.S. 338, 345-46 (1884).
31. See p. 627 and note 22 supra.
32. 131 Ct. Cl. at 511, 130 F. Supp. at 400.
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which the Government was liable in damages. All delay over one month
was held to be unreasonable.
In rejecting the method of awarding damages as adopted in the Great
Lakes case, the court held that there was present proof of damages more
reliable than the difference in plaintiff's estimate and its actual costs.,
The court noted that damages measured by showing the difference in
plaintiff's bid and his cost on the entire project, as adopted in the Great
Lakes and MacDougald cases, were not thereby approved for breach of
contract cases. The court went on to say that in the Great Lakes case
they were forced, by lack of other proof, to compute the increased costs
resulting from the unforeseen conditions encountered in the manner
adopted.
An examination of the facts as found by the court in the McGraw case
discloses that the principal reason why the Court of Claims refused to
follow the doctrine laid down in the Great Lakes case appears to be that
all the losses claimed were not due to causes attributable to the fault of
the Government. The evidence in the McGraw case did establish that
plaintiff had proved the propriety and reasonableness of its bid, and the
reasonableness of the contract price, both by expert testimony and by
an analysis and comparison of its bid with all the bids on the project, and
that the difference represented plaintiff's losses. 4 It thus appears that the
court's refusal to follow the Great Lakes case was due to the fact that
the evidence failed to establish the amount of damages sustained which
was attributable to causes other than the fault of the Government. Other
evidence was before the court showing the increased field office and home
office overhead, and the damages incurred through inefficiency of labor
resulting from the Government's breach. The court adopted the evidence
showing specific amounts which was considered more satisfactory than
the evidence purporting to establish damages on an over-all basis.
The court found that the actual loss of approximately $412,500 was
attributable in the main to two factors, namely, increased wages paid as
a result of the lifting of wage controls upon the termination of the war,
and the disruption, loss of continuity, and delay caused by the issuance
of the stop order. The court further found that plaintiff had complained
about difficulty experienced in obtaining an adequate supply of various
types of labor throughout the job, and that no doubt some part of the loss
was attributable to this condition. Hence, there were two factors causing
plaintiff's loss which were not attributable to the fault of the Government,
i.e., increased wages paid as a result of lifting wage controls, and difficulty
in obtaining adequate labor. The opinion does not show that there was
33. Id. at 512, 130 F. Supp. at 400.
34. Id. at 576-77.
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any proof segregating the amount of increased costs occasioned by the
two latter causes, which were not due to the fault of the Government and
should have been deducted from the over-all loss.
With respect to the increased wages paid due to the lifting of wage
controls, it is suggested, in proving the amount of damages suffered in
cases of this nature, that after establishing that the contract work would
have been completed by a certain date except for the breach, the in-
creased wages paid due to lifting wage controls should be segregated, and
the portion for which the Government was not responsible deducted from
the claim. With respect to the amount of damages occasioned by an in-
adequate supply of labor, it is suggested that evidence showing a reason-
able approximation of the amount may be introduced in claims of this
nature, thereby making it possible to confine the amount claimed to losses
due to the fault of the Government. The court allowed damages in the
amount of $41,812.77, approximately ten per cent of the sum which the
court found represented plaintiff's loss arrived at through the use of the
Great Lakes method. As it turned out, the amount allowed by the court
for inefficiency of labor due to disruption of operations was no doubt
based largely upon conjecture. This amounted to $28,531.15. It is im-
possible from a practical standpoint to prove in dollars and cents how
much more per hour or per day the actual labor, equipment and other
costs amount to when the contractor's operations are delayed and dis-
rupted.
It is therefore suggested that the most competent and reliable proof
that can be introduced in proving damages occasioned by a breach of
contract causing disruption of operations is to establish on an over-all
basis the reasonable cost of the work and the actual cost. The difference
between the two, less any amount due to causes not attributable to the
fault of the Government, fairly represents the amount of damages sus-
tained as a result of a breach of the contract. Of course, the evidence
must show that the contract work was performed in an efficient and work-
manlike manner. Failing this, it is necessary to resort to specific items of
damages.
The cases discussed above dealing with the measure of damages
appear to be the exception rather than the rule. Two other cases
which are pertinent in some respects are McCloskey v. United States,
and Chalender v. United States20 The McCloskey case, decided in 1928,
involved a breach of contract occasioned by the Government's failure to
furnish the site within the time required. The court allowed the difference
between plaintiff's estimated cost of the portions of the work affected by
35. 66 CL. c1. 105 (1928).
36. 127 Ct. CL 557, 119 F. Supp. 186 (1954).
1956-57]
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the breach, and the actual cost. The estimated cost adopted was based
upon the difference between offers of subcontractors, which formed the
basis of plaintiff's bid estimate, and the actual cost. The Chalender case,
decided in 1954, also involved a breach of contract. The court, in deter-
mining the reasonable cost of the work took into account the amount of
the Government estimate and the average of the next three highest
bids. It is to be noted that in the Great Lakes case the court considered
the average of all bids. In the Chalender case, the court awarded plaintiff
one-half the amount of its loss on the ground that the other half was not
due to the fault of the Government.
The case of Rodgers v. United States,"' involving a breach of contract,
is an example of the evidence failing to establish an adequate amount of
damages. The Court of Claims said the record showed that the con-
tractor was damaged in a much greater sum than they were permitted
to allow. 8 The court found that the contractor was highly efficient, had
adequate facilities, had performed every part of the contract in a work-
manlike manner, and that, with a minor exception, the contractor was
not responsible for any of the delays. The claim was itemized as to a
number of specific items of increased costs.
In the case of Stapleton Construction Co. v. United States,0 also in-
volving a breach of contract, the court allowed recovery of an amount
based upon the difference between the subcontract prices and the actual
cost of the work.
A few of the cases in which damages were allowed for specific items
proved will now be discussed.
In Myers v. United States,40 involving a breach of the contract by the
Government through its failure to furnish material within the time re-
quired by the contract, the court stated: "It is difficult, however, to find
a correct measuring rod for the amount of damages thus caused.""' The
court said that the greater portion of the claim was not satisfactorily
proved although it had no doubt that the actual damages were much more
than awarded. Instead of awarding damages on an over-all basis, the
court allowed specific items, the amounts of which were substantially less
than claimed.
In Warren Bros. Roads Co. v. United States,42 where a breach of a con-
tract arose out of delays caused by the Government, the court allowed
damages for increased labor, field and home office overhead, and rental
37. 99 Ct. CI. 393 (1943).
38. Id. at 413.
39. 92 Ct. CI. 551 (1940).
40. 120 Ct. CI. 126 (1951).
41. Id. at 137.
42. 123 Ct. C1. 48, 105 F. Supp. 826 (1952).
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value of equipment,43 as well as other miscellaneous items. No attempt
was made to base damages on the difference between a reasonable cost of
the work and the actual cost.
There are a number of other breach of contract cases in which specific
items of overhead, equipment rentals for idle time, increased labor and
material costs, and other miscellaneous items which were proved with
reasonable certainty have been allowed by the Court of Claims. However,
in most of these cases there were other substantial damages sustained for
which no recovery was allowed because of inadequate proof. A study of
the evidence in some of these cases 4 discloses that the plaintiffs were
deprived of recovery under circumstances where the evidence dearly
established that they were seriously damaged, but the amounts could not
be determined from the proof. It is suggested here that if proof had been
introduced on an over-all basis, where it was proved that the breach of
the contract seriously affected the performance of the contract work as
a whole, or such major portions thereof as could be segregated, as was
done in the Great Lakes and .JfacDougald cases, substantial justice would
have resulted.
In Bushnell Steel Co. v. United States," which involved a contract
covering the construction of eleven barges, the performance of which was
delayed by acts of the Government constituting a breach of contract, the
Court of Claims adopted an unusual method for awarding damages. The
amount allowed was based upon a comparison of plaintiff's actual costs
of fabrication of certain barges during a period when there was no con-
gestion, with the costs incurred during the period of the delay by the
Government causing congestion and the resultant disruption of operations.
In the case of Houston Ready Cut House Co. v. United States,40 the
court found the Government breached the contract in four respects by
(1) failing to provide access roads, (2) delay in site preparation, (3)
43. The rental value of equipment allowed was based upon OPA rates from which
the court deducted 50% for idle time. This is believed to be the only care in which the
Court of Claims used OPA rates for determining the reasonable value of equipment. In a
number of cases the Contractors Ownership Expense Manual of the Asiodated General
Contractors of America has been adopted by the Court of Claims for such purpores.
44. Allied Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 129 Ct. CI. 400, 124 F. Supp. 366 (1964);
Continental Nat'l Bank v. United States, 121 Ct. Cl. 203, 101 F. Supp. 755 (1952); Ir=i
& Leighton v. United States, 105 Ct. Cl. 398, 65 F. Supp. 794 (1946); Geo. A. Fuller Co.
v. United States, 105 CL Cl. 248, 63 F. Supp. 765 (1946); Brand Inv. Co. v. United States,
102 Ct. Cl. 40, 58 F. Supp. 749 (1944); Langevin v. United States, 100 Ct. CL 15 (1943);
Sobel v. United States, 88 Ct. Cl. 149 (1938) ; Plato v. United States, 86 CL CI. 665 (1938) ;
Phoenix Bridge Co. v. United States, 85 Ct. Cl. 603 (1937); Donnell-Zane Co. v. United
States, 75 Ct. CL. 36S (1932).
45. 117 CL Cl. 348, 91 F. Supp. 576 (1950).
46. 119 Ct. CL. 120, 96 F. Supp. 629 (1951).
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delay in furnishing grade lines, and (4) delay in furnishing certain draw-
ings and specifications. The principal items of damages claimed were
excess labor and material costs occasioned by the breach. Plaintiffs
introduced evidence of a comparison of cost between its construction of
a similar project at another location and the cost of constructing the
project involved in the claim. The Court of Claims said such a compari-
son cannot be expected to yield perfect accuracy but cited the case of
Needles v. United States4 7 in which it was stated that "absolute certainty
as to the amount of damages is not essential, this being a matter for de-
termination according to the circumstances of each case . . . . [A]l1
that the law requires is that such damages be allowed, as in the judgment
of fair men, directly and naturally resulted from the breach of contract
for which the suit is brought. ' 48 The court awarded judgment for excess
labor and materal costs, plus payroll taxes and insurance, based more or
less upon what may be said to have been a jury verdict.
Lost Profits
In order to recover lost profits as damages for breach of contract plain-
tiff must show the loss to be the immediate proximate result of the breach,
and that the loss in event of breach was within the contemplation of the
parties, either because it was natural and inevitable, and hence foresee-
able, or because of some special circumstances known to the defaulting
party when the contract was entered into.49 Furthermore, the claimant
must establish a sufficient basis for estimating the amount of profits lost
with reasonable certainty."° No recovery is allowable for profit on the
amount of plaintiff's damages. 51
Competency of Evidence
A very early case dealing with the competency of evidence in proving
the amount of damages sustained is that of Harvey v. United States.P2
There the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Claims "3 in its holding
that plaintiffs had no right to rely on the testimony of experts introduced
by them on the value of the work, and that they should have kept and
produced accounts of this cost and expense. The Court of Claims had
based its judgment upon the testimony of experts introduced by the
United States in awarding damages. The Supreme Court held that plain-
tiffs could not be deprived of reasonable compensation for their work
because they did not produce evidence of the character referred to, when
47. 101 Ct. C1. 535 (1944).
48. Id. at 618.
49. McCormick, Damages § 25 (1935).
50. Chain Belt Co. v. United States, 127 Ct. Cl. 38, 58, 115 F. Supp. 701, 714 (1953).
51. Torres v. United States, 126 Ct. C1. 76, 79, 112 F. Supp. 363, 365 (1953).
52. 113 U.S. 243 (1885).
53. 18 Ct. CI. 470 (1883).
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it did not appear that such evidence existed; provided, that the evidence
plaintiffs produced was the best evidence available to them and that it
enabled the court to arrive at a proper conclusion.
SUSPENSION OF WORK
As previously stated, the contracting agencies are generally without
authority to pay claims for damages for unreasonable delays caused by
the GovernmentY4 However, the Corps of Engineers, Department of the
Army, has included in its contract a provision designed to create a rem-
edy for paying certain types of damage claims arising out of delays
caused by acts of the Government. This provision is commonly known
as either paragraph G.C. 11 or G.C. 12.5 This paragraph gives the con-
tracting officer the right to suspend work for periods determined by him
to be necessary or desirable for the convenience of the Government, and
provides that where work is suspended, and the contractor is unreason-
ably delayed thereby, an equitable adjustment shall be made in the con-
tract price. The provision in question is at present peculiar to the Corps
of Engineers contracts, and contracts of the Atomic Energy Commission.
There have been a number of appeals decided by the Corps of Engi-
neers Claims and Appeals Board involving the suspension of work provi-
sion. Some have been allowed and others denied. Before discussing the
Board decisions, the one case decided by the Court of Claims in which
paragraph G.C. 11 was before it, should first be noted.
In Ozark Dam Constructors v. United States,-! the court held that
plaintiffs were entitled to recover on the ground that the Government had
breached the contract. The Corps of Engineers Claims and Appeals
Board had refused to grant relief under paragraph G.C. 11 on the ground
that a non-liability provision of the contract purporting to exempt the
54. See p. 621 and note 2 supra.
55. "SUSPENSION OF WORK: The contracting officer may order the contractor to
suspend all or any part of the work for such period of time as may be determined by him
to be necessary or desirable for the convenience of the Government. Unless such sumpTeson
unreasonably delays the progress of the work and causes additional expense or loss to the
contractor, no increase in contract price will be allowed. In the case of suspension of all or
any part of the work for an unreasonable length of time causing additional expense or loss,
not due to the fault or negligence of the contractor, the contracting officer shall make an
equitable adjustment in the contract price and modify the contract accordingly. An
equitable extension of time for the completion of the work in the event of any such -us-
pension will be allowed the contractor, provided, however, that the supension was not due
to the fault or negligence of the contractor. Provided, further, that no suspcnsion will be
ordered or adjustments made under this paragraph for delays arising as the rc-ult of changes
ordered or as the result of changed conditions encountered under the respcctive articles
relating to Changes and Changed Conditions or as the result of any delays for which an
extension of time may be granted under the Delays-Damages Article of this contract."
Corps of Engineers, U.S. Army, Construction Contract.
56. 130 Ct. Cl. 354, 127 F. Supp. 187 (1955).
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Government from liability for damages for delays caused by it in furnish-
ing materials controlled. The court held that the non-liability provision,
in light of the circumstances of the claim, was against public policy.
The court, in its opinion, mentioned paragraph G.C. 11 but did not decide
the question as to its applicability to the situation there involved. How-
ever, the dicta of the court indicated that such a contract provision would
be upheld in a proper cas0
Some of the appeals decided by the Corps of Engineers Claims and
Appeals Board which were allowed will now be discussed.
In an appeal where the contract provided that the right-of-way would
be furnished by others, and further provided that in the event of delay
only an extension of time would be granted, it became necessary during
the performance of the contract for the Government to procure the right-
of-way itself, and the work was delayed in doing so. The Board held that
since there was a change in responsibility, the delay was for the conven-
ience of the Government, and that the contractor was entitled to an equi-
table adjustment for the unreasonable delay under the suspension of work
provision. 8 The author suggests that even if there had been no change
in responsibility there would still have been a breach of the contract.
Since it was the duty of the Government to provide the right-of-way it
seems immaterial whether the Government provided it or had someone
else do it. In other appeals equitable adjustments were allowed by the
Board for unreasonable delays in making the site available.5
In an appeal where there were delays caused by collateral contractors,
occasioned by encountering changed conditions, the Board allowed an
equitable adjustment under paragraph G.C. 11. The Board held that
appellant's work was suspended for the convenience of the Government,
because the delays were necessary for the redesign of the work due to the
changed conditions0 °
In a situation where the Government unreasonably delayed the con-
tractor in furnishing information on the length of concrete piling, the
Board held the delay to be for the convenience of the Government, and
ruled in favor of the appellant." Other appeals were decided in favor of
the contractor on similar grounds.02
57. Id. at 360-61, 127 F. Supp. at 191.
58. Harrison & Burrows, Inc., Corps of Engineers, C & A No. 117.
59. Dennis & Sons, Corps of Engineers, C & A No. 518 (1954); Consolidated Builders,
Inc., Corps of Engineers, C & A No. 451 (1954); Gaasland Co., Corps of Engineers, C & A
No. 213 (1950).
60. Harris Structural Steel Co., Corps of Engineers, C & A No. 140 (1950).
61. Ottinger Bros., Corps of Engineers, C & A No. 149 (1950).
62. Walden, Fulton & Payne, Corps of Engineers, C & A No. 579 (1954); Curphy Co.,
Corps of Engineers, C & A No. 366 (1952); Flippen Materials Co., Corps of Engineers,
C & A No. 203 (1952).
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A few appeals where the Board refused to allow an equitable adjust-
ment under Paragraph G.C. 11 will now be discussed.
In a case where the contract provided for an extension of time for de-
lays caused by other contractors, the Board held the appellant was not
entitled to an equitable adjustment under the suspension of work provi-
sion, on the ground that it had not been established that the delay was
for the convenience of the Government, and that a specific provision of
the contract allowing a time extension only superseded the general pro-
visions relating to suspension of work.' Similar rulings were made in
other appeals.'
Contract provisions similar to the one included in contracts of the
Corps of Engineers referred to above are also presently included in con-
tracts of the Atomic Energy Commission. The Comptroller General has
ruled that there is no legal objection to such provisions, subject to certain
modifications.' It is clear that except for a contract provision of this
kind, which is designed to compensate a contractor for delays caused by
the Government, there would be no remedy under the contract and con-
tractors would have to resort to the courts for relief.
There is now under consideration by various agencies and departments
of the Government the question of including a provision similar to the
suspension of work clause in their construction contracts.
CONCLUSION
The law is well established that a person who has violated his contract
will not be permitted to reap advantage from his own wrong, and that he
should not be permitted to escape liability because of the lack of a perfect
measure of damages caused by the breach. This applies with equal force
to Government contracts. It is considered safe to say that in the great
majority of breach of contract cases the contractor's operations are dis-
rupted, and it is impossible to segregate in cost records the additional
number of hours, days, weeks, or months of labor, equipment, or other
costs incurred as a result of delays and disruption of operations.
It therefore seems necessary to consider the difference between the
reasonable cost of the work and the actual cost in determining with any
degree of accuracy the amount of damages sustained where there is a
serious disruption of operations. Appropriate allowances must be made
for items of cost which resulted from causes other than those due to the
fault of the Government.
63. Sager Constr. Co., Corps of Engineers, C & A No. 309 (1952).
64. Albeni Contractors, Corps of Engineers, C & A No. 565 (1954); McDonald Bros.,
Corps of Engineers, C & A No. 433 (1954); Armiger Constr. Corp., Corps of Engineers,
C & A No. 351.
65. Comp. Gen. Dec. No. B-127764, Oct. 11, 1956.
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